The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion – A Reply
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چکیده
In a recent “pamphlet” Shaked (2005) harshly criticizes two of our papers, Fehr and Schmidt (1999, 2003). This reply shows that Shaked's charges are not substantiated in any way. It points out several logical flaws in his arguments and shows that he grossly misquotes and misinterprets our papers. * This note is a reply to A. Shaked, “The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion”, dated March 1, 2005. a) Ernst Fehr, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Bluemlisalpstrasse 10, CH8006 Zurich, Switzerland, email: [email protected] (corresponding author). b) Klaus M. Schmidt, Department of Economics, University of Munich, Ludwigstrasse 28, D-80539 Muenchen, Germany, email: [email protected].
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تاریخ انتشار 2005