Pivots versus signals in elections

Incentives in voting models typically hinge on the event that a voter is pivotal. But voting can also in‡uence the future behavior of political elites. In this paper, we consider a model in which voters have private information about their policy preferences and an election is held in each of two periods. In this setting, a vote in the …rst period can have two types of consequences; it may be pivotal in deciding who wins the …rst election and it provides a signal that informs the beliefs that candidates running in the second election use when selecting equilibrium platforms. Pivot events are exceedingly unlikely, but when they occur the e¤ect of a single vote is enormous, determining the electoral outcome. In contrast, vote totals always have some signaling e¤ect on future policies, but the e¤ect of a single vote is always very small. We investigate whether the former, pivot, e¤ect or the latter, signaling, e¤ect drives equilibrium voting behavior in large electorates. Associate Professor of Politics, Princeton University. Princeton, NJ 08544. Email: [email protected]. yAssociate Professor of Political Economy, Stanford Graduate School of Business. 518 Memorial Way, Stanford CA 94305-5015. Email: [email protected].