A Variation on Ellsberg∗

نویسندگان

  • Kfir Eliaz
  • Pietro Ortoleva
چکیده

Ellsberg’s experiment involved a gamble with no ambiguity (N) and a gamble where the prize that could be won is objectively known, but the winning probability depends on the (ambiguous) urn’s composition (P). We extend this by including a gamble where the winning probability is objectively known, but the prize depends on the urn’s composition (C), and also gambles where both the probability and the prize depend on the urn’s composition, and can either be correlated positively (D) or negatively (M). Among transitive subjects who prefer N to P, 40% prefer D to N, 74% prefer D to P, 97% prefer D to M, and the modal ranking (about 39%) satisfies D<N<P,C. We show that this behavior is compatible with the Max-Min Expected Utility model if every prior in the set of priors has a high enough variance, a property that we call ‘skeptical

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

A Quantum Cognition Analysis of the Ellsberg Paradox

The expected utility hypothesis is one of the foundations of classical approaches to economics and decision theory and Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle is a fundamental element of it. It has been put forward that real-life situations exist, illustrated by the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, in which the Sure-Thing Principle is violated, and where also the expected utility hypothesis does not hold. ...

متن کامل

Ellsberg Meets Nash: the Ellsberg Task as a Game

In his PhD thesis, Ellsberg formulated strong experimental conditions for his proposed tests of subjective expected utility theory. Subjects should have no reason to consider the motives of the urn filler. Standard incentivized experiments do not meet these conditions. Instead of a one-person decision problem, the task can be perceived as a two-player game. One player chooses among the bets. Th...

متن کامل

Modeling the Ellsberg Paradox by Argument Strength

We present a formal measure of argument strength, which combines the ideas that conclusions of strong arguments are (i) highly probable and (ii) their uncertainty is relatively precise. Likewise, arguments are weak when their conclusion probability is low or when it is highly imprecise. We show how the proposed measure provides a new model of the Ellsberg paradox. Moreover, we further substanti...

متن کامل

Comparative Ignorance and the Ellsberg Phenomenon

The “Ellsberg phenomenon” has played a significant role in research on imprecise probabilities. Fox and Tversky [7] have attempted to explain this phenomenon in terms of their “comparative ignorance” hypothesis. We challenge that explanation and suggest that our recent empirical work suggests an explanation that is much closer to Ellsberg’s own diagnosis.

متن کامل

Testing Ambiguity and Machina Preferences Within a Quantum-theoretic Framework for Decision-making

The Machina thought experiments pose to major non-expected utility models challenges that are similar to those posed by the Ellsberg thought experiments to subjective expected utility theory (SEUT). We test human choices in the ‘Ellsberg three-color example’, confirming typical ambiguity aversion patterns, and the ‘Machina 50/51 and reflection examples’, partially confirming the preferences hyp...

متن کامل

Can quantum decision theory explain the Ellsberg paradox?

We report the results of an experiment we performed to test the matching probabilities for the Ellsberg paradox predicted by the quantum decision model of al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2016). We find that the theoretical predictions of that model are in conformity with our experimental results. This supports the thesis that violations of classical (Kolmogorov) probability theory may not be due to irrat...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2011