Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 a New Approach for Modeling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections

نویسندگان

  • R. Michael Alvarez
  • Jonathan Nagler
  • Michael Alvarez
چکیده

Whether voters vote strategically, using their vote to best further their interests, or vote sincerely, voting for their rst choice among the alternatives, is a question of longstanding interest. We o er two innovations in searching for the answer to this question. First, we begin with a more consistent model of sincere voting in multiparty democratic systems than has been presented in the literature to date. Second, we incorporate new operationalizations of the objective potential for strategic behavior than have been used in the past. We o er a test of strategic voting in the 1987 British General Election based on the variance in strategic setting across constituencies in Britain. We allow voters to use available information in deciding whether or not to cast a strategic vote. We estimate a lower level of strategic voting than many other methods have estimated. We also demonstrate that the use of self-reported vote motivation causes errors in estimating the amount of strategic voting, and that this problem is exacerbated the further from the election the self-report is obtained. A New Approach for Modeling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections R. Michael Alvarez Jonathan Nagler

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Strategic Voting in Sequential Committees

We consider strategic voting with incomplete information and partially common values in sequential committees. A proposal is considered against the status quo in one committee, and only upon its approval advances for consideration in a second committee. Committee members (i) are privately and imperfectly informed about an unobservable state of nature which is relevant to their payoffs, and (ii)...

متن کامل

Nber Working Paper Series Experimenting with Measurement Error: Techniques with Applications to the Caltech Cohort Study

Measurement error is ubiquitous in experimental work. It leads to imperfect statistical controls, attenuated estimated effects of elicited behaviors, and biased correlations between characteristics. We develop simple statistical techniques for dealing with experimental measurement error. These techniques are applied to data from the Caltech Cohort Study, which conducts repeated incentivized sur...

متن کامل

Op-scan120058 341..350

Peter Sokol-Hessner, Colin F. Camerer, and Elizabeth A. Phelps Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences (HSS), California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences (HSS) and Computational and Neural Systems (CNS), California Institute of Technology, 1200 E. California Blvd., Pasadena, CA 91125, USA, and Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washing...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 1997