Conict Games with Payo¤Uncertainty1
نویسندگان
چکیده
Stag hunt and chicken games are canonical representations of two kinds of strategic interactions. In stag hunt, aggression feeds on itself, and mutual fear escalates into conict. Chicken is a model of preemption and deterrence. With complete information, these games have multiple Nash equilbria. Using standard arguments from the Industrial Organization literature, we nd su¢ cient conditions for payo¤ uncertainty to generate a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. These conditions encompass information structures ranging from independent types (as in our previous work) to highly correlated types (as in global games).
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تاریخ انتشار 2009