Abstention in Dynamical Models of Spatial Voting
نویسنده
چکیده
We consider a model of platform adaptation in spatial voting focussing on the effect of abstention on the stability of the mean voter equilibrium. Two distinct approaches for modeling abstention are explored: (1) voters abstain if party platforms are too similar to each other and (2) voters abstain if both party platforms are far away from their ideal points.
منابع مشابه
Abstention causes bifurcations in two-party voting dynamics
In a recent dynamical systems model of platform adaptation in spatial voting models, Miller and Stadler (J. Econ. Dyn. & Control 1998, in press) showed that, assuming concave voter utility functions and complete participation, there is a globally stable equilibrium located at the mean voter position. Here we show that abstention depending on the distances between voters and platforms may lead t...
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تاریخ انتشار 2000