Maciej H . Kotowski and Fei Li

On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations. We extend our results to the...

On Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Senders ∗

In a multi-sender Bayesian persuasion game, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2012) show that increasing the number of senders cannot decrease the amount of information revealed. They assume: (i) senders reveal information simultaneously, (ii) senders’ information can be arbitrarily correlated, and (iii) senders play pure strategies. This paper shows that these three conditions are also necessary to the r...

A Note on Stability in One-to-One, Multi-period Matching Markets

We introduce a new stability concept for multi-period matching markets. Robust prescient stability asserts that agents exhibit foresight concerning how a market can develop in the future, but they retain ambiguity concerning how the market will develop. We show that a robustly presciently stable matching exists for any configuration of agents’ preferences.

Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction

Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: Comment

This note demonstrates epsilon equilibria in the first-price auction that achieve lower worst-case expected revenues than the lower bound proposed by Turocy (“Auction Choice for Ambiguity-Averse Sellers Facing Strategic Uncertainty,” Games and Economic Behavior 62, pp. 155–179, 2008). Additionally, it stresses the importance of a careful specification of the action space to properly characteriz...