The Devolution Tortoise and the Centralization Hare

There has been much talk in recent years of devolving powers and functions from the federal government to the states. Some observers even proclaim a “devolution revolution” (Nathan 1996), the result of which will be a more efficient and effective federal government and more robust and responsive states. The generally recognized objectives of devolution include (1) more efficient provision and production of public services; (2) better alignment of the costs and benefits of government for a diverse citizenry; (3) better fits between public goods and their spatial characteristics; (4) increased competition, experimentation, and innovation in the public sector; (5) greater responsiveness to citizen preferences; and (6) more transparent accountability in policymaking. These are ambitious objectives, although, to date, no consensus on direction is apparent, no plan of execution is in place, and examples of devolution are scarce. Indeed, there are only two commonly cited examples of devolution: congressional repeal of the national 55-mph speed limit and welfare reform. The prospects for significant devolution during the foreseeable future are not bright, largely because federal officials are reluctant to relinquish powers they have acquired in the twentieth century to advance national policy objectives. Consequently, devolution is plodding along at a turtle’s pace while centralization is still racing ahead at a rabbit’s pace.