Department of Economics Sequential vs. Single-round Uniform-price Auctions

We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with a¢ liated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k1 objects are sold in the …rst round and k2 in the second round, with and without revelation of the …rst-round winning bids. We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing e¤ect that reduces the …rst-round price. Total revenue is greater in a single-round, uniform auction for k = k1 + k2 objects than in a sequential uniform auction with no bid announcement. When the …rst-round winning bids are announced, we also identify a positive informational e¤ect on the second-round price. Total expected revenue in a sequential uniform auction with winning-bids announcement may be greater or smaller than in a single-round uniform auction, depending on the model’s parameters. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: D44, D82.