COORDINATION FAILURE IN REPEATED GAMES WITH ALMOST-PUBLIC MONITORING By
نویسندگان
چکیده
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have bounded recall (i.e., there is a bound L such that in any period, the last L signals are sufficient to determine behavior). We show that, in games with general almost-public private monitoring, this is essentially the only behavior that can coordinate continuation play.
منابع مشابه
Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have bounded ...
متن کاملStephen Morris “ Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost - Public Monitoring ” PIER Working
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing publicmonitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have bound...
متن کاملGeorge J . Mailath and Stephen Morris “ Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have boun...
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Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. This paper asks the robustness of such equilibrium play with respect to privatemonitoring perturbations that are ex-ante close to the public-monitoring structure. We show that, in two-player games with full support of public signals, no perfect public equilibrium is robust to private-monitoring perturbations under a ...
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