Cheating can stabilize cooperation in mutualisms.
نویسندگان
چکیده
Mutualisms present a challenge for evolutionary theory. How is cooperation maintained in the face of selection for selfishness and cheating? Both theory and data suggest that partner choice, where one species preferentially directs aid to the more cooperative members of the other species, is central to cooperation in many mutualisms. However, the theory has only so far considered the evolutionary effects of partner choice on one of the species in a mutualism in isolation. Here, we investigate the co-evolution of cooperation and choice in a choosy host and its symbiont. Our model reveals that even though choice and cooperation may be initially selected, it will often be unstable. This is because choice reduces variation in the symbiont and, therefore, tends to remove the selective incentive for its own maintenance (a scenario paralleled in the lek paradox in female choice and policing in within-species cooperation). However, we also show that when variability is reintroduced into symbionts each generation, in the form of less cooperative individuals, choice is maintained. This suggests that the presence of cheaters and cheater species in many mutualisms is central to the maintenance of partner choice and, paradoxically, cooperation itself.
منابع مشابه
Selection for cheating across disparate environments in the legume-rhizobium mutualism.
The primary dilemma in evolutionarily stable mutualisms is that natural selection for cheating could overwhelm selection for cooperation. Cheating need not entail parasitism; selection favours cheating as a quantitative trait whenever less-cooperative partners are more fit than more-cooperative partners. Mutualisms might be stabilised by mechanisms that direct benefits to more-cooperative indiv...
متن کاملEconomic contract theory tests models of mutualism.
Although mutualisms are common in all ecological communities and have played key roles in the diversification of life, our current understanding of the evolution of cooperation applies mostly to social behavior within a species. A central question is whether mutualisms persist because hosts have evolved costly punishment of cheaters. Here, we use the economic theory of employment contracts to f...
متن کاملDiminishing returns in social evolution: the not-so-tragic commons.
A challenge for evolutionary theory is to understand how cooperation can occur in the presence of competition and cheating, a problem known as the tragedy of commons. Here I examine how varying the fitness returns from reproductive competition or cooperation affects the negative impact of competition on a social group. Varying linear returns does not affect the impact of competition. However, d...
متن کاملApplying Reversible Mutations of Nodulation and Nitrogen-Fixation Genes to Study Social Cheating in Rhizobium etli-Legume Interaction
Mutualisms are common in nature, though these symbioses can be quite permeable to cheaters in situations where one individual parasitizes the other by discontinuing cooperation yet still exploits the benefits of the partnership. In the Rhizobium-legume system, there are two separate contexts, namely nodulation and nitrogen fixation processes, by which resident Rhizobium individuals can benefit ...
متن کاملCheating and the evolutionary stability of mutualisms.
Interspecific mutualisms have been playing a central role in the functioning of all ecosystems since the early history of life. Yet the theory of coevolution of mutualists is virtually nonexistent, by contrast with well-developed coevolutionary theories of competition, predator-prey and host-parasite interactions. This has prevented resolution of a basic puzzle posed by mutualisms: their persis...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
- Proceedings. Biological sciences
دوره 273 1598 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006