I Overview 3 1 . Canadian Political Culture ( s ) in Transition and the State of

ideological discourse surrounding multiculturalism as a value principle. In this chapter we will proceed to unpack the concept of multiculturalism as an ideological paradigm, and develop certain normative criteria with which to judge the current model of cultural pluralism in Canada. Regardless of strict definitions, multiculturalism, or the “politics of difference,” is a response to the late twentieth-century phenomenon that has been called the “age of migration,” challenging countries to redefine the rules of political life.10 CHALLENGING LIBERALISM: THE IMPACT OF MULTICULTURALISM According to Christian Joppke, multiculturalism is an intellectual movement premised around the concepts of equality and emancipation. Its appeal lies in the defence of particularistic, mostly ascriptively defined group identities that reject western universalism as the basis for allegiance to a given collectivity. Western universalism in this view is seen as “falsely homogenizing and a smokescreen for power.”11 As such, multiculturalism implies the salience of multiple cultures coexisting within a limited state-bounded territory, rejecting the modern Jacobin view of the nation-state and the homogenization of identities. The key issue is that such “cultural communities” are said to regulate not only specific aspects, but the entire life conduct and sources of meaning of the individual. Joppke summarizes: Defenders of multiculturalism have argued that the exercise of individual rights and liberties depends on full and unimpeded membership in a respected and flourishing cultural group. But the tension between l iberalism and multiculturalism is real, as the latter is based on the ontological primacy of the group over the individual and, if necessary, takes into the bargain the suppression of individual claims.12 Framing Citizenship Status in an Age of Polyethnicity 317 In short, this approach views assimilation or acculturation as a violation of the integrity or dignity of the individual, whose cultural habits should be recognized fully as an integral element of a person’s identity. Any stifling of particular cultural expressions by way of the symbolic construction of a larger socio-cultural identity limits the individual’s capacity for self-realization, thus negating the liberal-democratic ideal that individuals, as members of the larger society, be given the means by which to explore their own life chances and directions. As such, ascriptive aspects of identity — particular cultural sources of meaning — are said to act as prerequisites to self-realization. Stripping such sources of meaning in the name of universal markers of identity, in the construction of a national (Jacobin) identity that is meant to provide common purpose, denies the individual the empowerment to determine the direction of his/her life through participation in the affairs of society. Iris Marion Young argues that if one conceptualizes such cultural differences as “relationally constituted structural differentiations,” then the supposed link between citizenship and the common good is upheld, because: It becomes clear that socially situated interests, proposals, claims and expressions of experience are often an important resource for democratic discussion and decision-making. Such situated knowledges can both pluralize and relativize hegemonic discourses, and offer otherwise unspoken knowledge to contribute to wise decisions.13 The polemic between universal and particular bases of allegiance thus demarcates the contours of the debate. With the increasing polyethnic composition of nation-states, the debate has emerged largely as a challenge to the homogenizing tendencies of classical liberal models of citizenship. The idea of multiculturalism can be embedded in a wider area of post-national consciousness — some say postmodern, or “identity politics” — as an attack on the assimilation implied by nation-states with the aim of attaching a sense of common purpose to citizenship status.14 The sentiments associated with equal citizenship status have long been regarded by liberal theorists as integral to democratic political communities — for fostering the civic-spiritedness, mutual trust and allegiance required for meaningful self-government, self-realization and political stability. Kymlicka notes that the classical liberal response to polyethnicity has been to develop common (undifferentiated) bases of citizenship in a universal vein. In this view, the integrative function of citizenship requires that cultural differences be treated with “benign neglect,” in order that a shared civic identity is forged regardless of collective, or group-based identity differences. Iris Marion Young notes that proponents of such arguments view any particular demands based on sociological “differences” as detrimental to the functioning of democracy due to the contention that citizens concern themselves less with the common 318 Alain-G. Gagnon and Raffaele Iacovino good and more with their own group-based, or “special” interests.15 Kymlicka summarizes this view: Citizenship is by definition a matter of treating people as individuals with equal rights under the law.... [If it is group differentiated], nothing will bind the various groups in society together, and prevent the spread of mutual mistrust or conflict. If citizenship is differentiated, it no longer provides a shared experience or common status. Citizenship would yet be another force for disunity, rather than a way of cultivating unity in the face of increasing social diversity. Citizenship should be a forum where people transcend their differences, and think about the common good of all citizens.16 In short, according to the classical liberal view, culture, like religion, should be left to the private sphere and should not concern the state. The only way for a democracy to flourish is for the political community to be predicated on universal bases of belonging which are “civic” and amenable to identification across cultures. For defenders of multiculturalism, however, the notion of benign neglect is in itself infused with cultural meaning. It simply represents a preservation of the status quo in many previously homogeneous nation-states. State inactivity thus reflects a failure to adapt to dynamic polyethnic realities in society. Minority cultures are rendered unequal participants and second-class citizens if their sources of meaning are neglected in the public realm. As such, the ideal of equality cannot be achieved if citizens are forced to conform to a “civic” denial of identity, a renewed self-definition for individual citizens. Isajiw notes that the force of multiculturalism arises out of a particular sentiment in which citizen dignity is tied to the collective dignity of one’s ethnic community. Multiculturalism represents a set of values whereby the recognition of identity needs is linked to the instrumental power of members of ethnic communities.17 Charles Taylor explains: The demand for recognition in [the politics of multiculturalism] is given urgency by the supposed links between recognition and identity ... The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted or reduced mode of being.18 The recognition of cultural pluralism by the state is thus a call for increased citizen empowerment. How are citizens in a polyethnic society equally empowered to share and participate in the affairs of the polity, without sacrificing self-fulfilling “modes of being”? How have states adapted to such challenges? The theoretical contours outlined above reveal that normative evaluations of integration rest on two broad considerations. The first is that full citizenFraming Citizenship Status in an Age of Polyethnicity 319 ship status requires that all cultural identities be allowed to participate in democratic life equally, without the necessity to tone down conceptions of identity to the level of the individual. Empowerment implies that citizens are permitted to maintain their cultural differences when impacting the affairs of the polity through democratic participation. This implies some acceptance that policy outcomes will reflect some groups’ differentiated initiatives by the central state. The second concerns the salience of unity in any society. Here the key element is a sense of common purpose in public matters in order that deliberation is not confined to pockets of self-contained, fragmented collectivities in juxtaposition. These two broad poles are at issue in any model of integration and subsequent conceptualizations of citizenship status. In short, a balance must be struck between the equal empowerment of group identities as active constituents of the larger political community and the need for a common ground for dialogue, for the purposes of unity — a centre that also serves as an identity marker in the larger society and denotes in itself a pole of allegiance for all citizens. Prior to proceeding with the comparative study, however, it must be noted that such policies cannot be assessed in the absence of a clear understanding of political processes related to the strategy of nation-building. This qualification is particularly salient in the Canadian case, where the precarious nature of pan-Canadian identity has traditionally been in itself somewhat of a “national symbol” (sic) due to the persistent existential question in Quebec. Indeed, as will be demonstrated below, policymakers at the federal level charged with defining the bases of belonging to Canada have not only faced the challenges associated with the incorporation of diverse cultural identities, but have been confronted with a national minority with established political institutions within a well-circumscribed territory as well. This fact represents a qualitatively different challenge confronting Canada in comparison to the United States. As Joppke makes clear, each society’s actual response to immigration and polyethnicity does not merely stem from an abstract model that is subsequently applied to the real world: The concrete meaning of multiculturalism and its linkage to immigration differs significantly across these societies. These differences are conditioned by distinct traditions of nationhood, the specific historical contexts in which immigration has taken place, and the existing immigration regimes.19 As such, the case of Quebec, although formally a province of Canada, nevertheless merits independent consideration, because the Quebec state has negotiated extensive authority over immigration. Moreover, Quebec constitutes a distinct political community with a well-defined collective cultural project that includes the integration of immigrants into that project. Other provinces, by contrast, have been content to leave this policy area in the hands of the federal government. In short, Quebec should be viewed as a host society 320 Alain-G. Gagnon and Raffaele Iacovino in its own right, with its own historical and cultural development, its own sense of nationhood, and a distinct discourse with regards to the general orientations and choices of society. There are indeed political imperatives at work in such policy outcomes. This chapter has attempted to clarify the meaning of the term “multiculturalism” — distinguishing between its use as a general label for an emerging tradition in political thought and the actual policy bearing its name in Canada — in order to alleviate the ambiguities surrounding the concept. An assessment of Canadian multiculturalism cannot forgo the fact that in the final analysis it is a policy and not an “ontological” principle devoid of contingencies. The ideal of multiculturalism must not be confused with the Canadian policy, as this is prone to stifling debate concerning the value of the policy in framing citizenship status. CULTURAL PLURALISM IN THE US: THE “MELTING-POT” METAPHOR The case of the United States can be deemed a benchmark in evaluating state policy with regard to polyethnicity. To a large extent, the liberal emphasis on “benign neglect” in cultural matters, as a basis for common citizenship status, has permeated American discourse and has been traditionally embraced as somewhat of a founding principle of American identity. The US response to polyethnicity has followed a doctrine of assimilation. John Miller traces this approach as a founding ideal of what it means to be American: [America] is a nation dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. This extraordinary notion animates the American people, whose very sense of peoplehood derives not from a common lineage but from their adherence to a set of core principles about equality, liberty and self-government. These ideas, recognised at the founding of the United States, are universal. They apply to all humankind. They know no racial or ethnic limits. They are not bound by time or history. And they lie at the centre of American nationhood. Because of this, these ideas uphold an identity into which immigrants from all over the world can assimilate, as long as they, too, dedicate themselves to the proposition.20 Minority cultures of all stripes were expected to shed their values, cultures, and languages and unconditionally adopt those of the larger society. This approach can be characterized as one in which the idea of benign neglect in the identity, or cultural sphere, ensures that all citizens may participate equally in democratic life. It is reductionist in the sense that the markers for identity are laid out in a procedural manner, a legalistic approach to citizenship which emphasizes the primacy of individual rights in the public sphere. The question of culture itself is relegated to the private sphere, culture is not considered to be a political concern. Katz explains: Framing Citizenship Status in an Age of Polyethnicity 321 our Bill of Rights, in contrast to every other modern bill of rights, is almost entirely procedural. It has virtually no substantive protections.... [it] consists almost entirely of what could be called civil and political rights ... [and] our procedural rights relate almost exclusively to individuals.21 Katz argues that the interpretation of equality in the United States is still very much a product of mid-nineteenth-century views as espoused in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The former amendment states that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside.”22 This provision has been interpreted by the courts in a manner that denied the amendments’ possible use as a basis for addressing minority group rights. Equality demanded that individuals be protected from state intrusions but was not designed to eliminate “private” discrimination. The idea of equal citizenship before the law came to represent the “equal” protection of all citizens from discriminatory measures by state action. Any other form of discrimination experienced by groups was a question of private conduct and hence dismissed as constituting a political issue. Katz summarizes: our tradition ... became at least partly one of constitutional discrimination against groups rather than protection of them, and it was based on the growing prescription of individual equality and equal protection of the laws.23 Such a tradition has been largely upheld in the United States in its formulation of citizenship status. The one significant caveat has been the rather recent attempt to address the reality of groups that have suffered discrimination, historically, through these interpretations of equality. Under the banner of “affirmative action,” an attempt was made to grant minority groups special access to educational institutions, broadcasting, employment, etc., in order that such institutions may better reflect the proportion of group identification in the general population. This was deemed a necessary measure in order to compensate for “lost ground.” However, such provisions were qualified to a large degree. The Courts’ test of constitutionality of these measures was such that the groups that were discriminated against had to prove that the nature of the intention of particular cases of discrimination was blatant, and not a consequence of the “latent” effects of private actions. In other words, the burden of proof required in order to benefit from such group-based provisions of equal status rested on minority groups themselves, not on empirical structural inequalities. In the final analysis, this tradition with regard to citizenship status in the United States prevails. Indeed, the question of the effects of affirmative action on the melting-pot metaphor as a symbol for national identity has resulted in virulent reaction.24 If multiculturalism has achieved somewhat of an “ontological status” in Canada, in the United States it is deemed by many to run counter to the very defining principles of American democracy. Again, equality 322 Alain-G. Gagnon and Raffaele Iacovino in this view rests on reductionist principles — a matter of non-discrimination and the equal opportunity to participate. It is in this light that American sociologist Nathan Glazer describes the role of culture as it pertains to state policy: [immigrants] had come to this country not to maintain a foreign language and culture but with the intention ... to become Americanized as fast as possible, and this meant English language and American culture. They sought the induction to a new language and culture that the public schools provided — as do many present-day immigrants, too — and while they often found, as time went on, that they regretted what they and their children had lost, this was their choice ... The United States, whatever the realities of discrimination and segregation, had as a national ideal a unitary and new ethnic identity, that of American.25 For Schlesinger, Jr. as well, the key to American stability in the face of increasing polyethnicity has and will remain embedded in the melting-pot: The United States had a brilliant solution for the inherent fragility, the inherent combustibility, of a multiethnic society; the creation of a brand new national identity by individuals who, in forsaking old loyalties and joining to make new lives, melted away ethnic differences — a national identity that absorbs and transcends the diverse ethnicities that come to our shore ... The point of America was not to preserve old cultures, but to produce a new American culture.26 The basis of such identification is a “civic culture” — the notion that individuals are bound by equal adherence to a set of principles. Jürgen Habermas has labelled this approach “constitutional patriotism.” The state here is interpreted as the “domain of law,” while collective identity based on national allegiance is the “affective realm.” Thus citizenship implies a civic patriotism, void of national identity. Political legitimacy as such stems from the procedures of democracy itself rather than any attachment to historical or cultural attributes.27 Schlesinger, Jr. calls this set of principles the “American Creed,” which is rooted in the practical obligations of civic participation and a patriotic commitment to a “democratic faith.” In this view, democracy is not the product of citizen dignity through the recognition of diverse cultural contexts, but the precursor to unity. Procedural democracy comes to be the much heralded symbol of identification which all Americans share. In sum, the American response to polyethnicity has been to deny differences altogether and focus on the symbolic virtue of a “central” American identity, based on a procedurally (legally) defined conception of equal individual rights. THE POLITICS OF MULTICULTURALISM IN CANADA The idea of multiculturalism in Canada came into awareness largely as a result of a negative response to the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Biculturalism and Bilingualism (B&B) in the mid-1960s by a “third force” — groups that represented immigrant ethnic communities.28 The Framing Citizenship Status in an Age of Polyethnicity 323 commission was spearheaded by Prime Minister Pearson as a response to the rise of a reinvigorated Quebec nationalism through the Quiet Revolution, and the subsequent questioning of Quebec’s collective place in a federation dominated largely by Anglo-Canadians in economic, cultural, and political affairs.29