Possibilistic Logic, Preferential Models, Non-monotonicity and Related Issues

The links between Shoham's preference logic and possibilistic logic, a numerical logic of uncertainty based on Zadeh's possibility measures, are investigated. Starting from a fuzzy set of preferential interpretations of a propositional theory, we prove that the notion of preferential entailment is closely related to a previously introduced notion of conditional possibility. Conditional possibility is then shown to possess all properties (originally stated by Gabbay) of a well-behaved non-monotonic consequence relation. We obtain the possibilistic counterpart of Adams' e-semantics of conditional probabilities which is the basis of the probabilistic model of non-monotonic logic proposed by Geffner and Pearl. Lastly we prove that our notion of possibilistic entailment is the one at work in possibilistic logic, a logic that handles uncertain propositional formulas, where uncertainty is modelled by degrees of necessity, and where partial inconsistency is allowed. Considering the formerly established close links between Gardenfors'epistemic entrenchment and necessity measures, what this paper proposes is a new way of relating belief revision and non-monotonic inference, namely via possibility theory.