A Simple Tool for Qualitatively Testing, Quantitatively Measuring, and Normatively Justifying Savage’s Subjective Expected Utility
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper introduces a new preference condition that can be used to justify (or criticize) expected utility. The approach taken in this paper is an alternative to Savage’s, and is accessible to readers without a mathematical background. It is based on a method for deriving “comparisons of tradeoffs” from ordinal preferences. Our condition simplifies previously-published tradeoff conditions, and at the same time provides more general and more powerful tools to specialists. The condition is more closely related to empirical methods for measuring utility than its predecessors. It provides a unifying tool for qualitatively testing, quantitatively measuring, and normatively justifying expected utility.
منابع مشابه
A Savage-Like Axiomatization for Nonstandard Expected Utility
Since Leonard Savage’s epoch-making memoir [13], Subjective Expected Utility Theory has been the presumptive model for decision-making. Savage provided an act-based axiomatization of standard expected utility theory. In this article, we provide a Savage-like axiomatization of nonstandard expected utility theory. It corresponds to a weakening of Savage’s 6 axiom.
متن کاملSimple axioms for countably additive subjective probability
Thispaper refines Savage’s theoryof subjectiveprobability for the caseof countably additive beliefs. First, I replace his continuity axiomsP6 andP7with a simplemodification of Arrow’s (1970) Monotone Continuity. Second, I relax Savage’s primitives: in my framework, the class of events need not be a -algebra, and acts need not have finite or bounded range. By varying the domains of acts and even...
متن کاملRisk and Uncertainty Program TITLE: Savage Games A Theory of Strategic Interaction with Purely Subjective Uncertainty AUTHORS:
We define and discuss Savage games, which are ordinal games that are set in L. J. Savage’s framework of purely subjective uncertainty. Every Bayesian game is ordinally equivalent to a Savage game. However, Savage games are free of priors, probabilities and payoffs. Players’ information and subjective attitudes toward uncertainty are encoded in the state-dependent preferences over state continge...
متن کاملThe impossibility of compromise : some uniqueness properties of expected utility preferences ?
We focus on the following uniqueness property of expected utility preferences: Agreement of two preferences on one interior indifference class implies their equality. We show that, besides expected utility preferences under (objective) risk, this uniqueness property holds for subjective expected utility preferences in Anscombe-Aumann’s (partially subjective) and Savage’s (fully subjective) sett...
متن کاملSavage Games A Theory of Strategic Interaction with Purely Subjective Uncertainty
We define and discuss Savage games, which are ordinal games that are set in L. J. Savage’s framework of purely subjective uncertainty. Every Bayesian game is ordinally equivalent to a Savage game. However, Savage games are free of priors, probabilities and payoffs. Players’ information and subjective attitudes toward uncertainty are encoded in the state-dependent preferences over state continge...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2004