RISE Working Paper 14 - 00 2 “ Mediocracy ” by Andrea Mattozzi , Antonio Merlo RISE RICE INITIATIVE for the STUDY of ECONOMICS
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could select better individuals. Furthermore, we show that this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional than in majoritarian electoral systems. JEL Classification: D72
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