A Note on the Approximation of Mean-Payoff Games
نویسنده
چکیده
We consider the problem of designing approximation schemes for the values of mean-payoff games. It was recently shown that (1) mean-payoff with rational weights scaled on [−1, 1] admit additive fully-polynomial approximation schemes, and (2) mean-payoff games with positive weights admit relative fully-polynomial approximation schemes. We show that the problem of designing additive/relative approximation schemes for general mean-payoff games (i.e. with no constraint on their edge-weights) is P-time equivalent to determining their exact solution.
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تاریخ انتشار 2011