Outside options and CEO turnover: The network effect

Article history: Received 17 September 2013 Received in revised form 1 March 2014 Accepted 11 March 2014 Available online 19 March 2014 Most studies consider chief executive officer (CEO) turnover from the firm's perspective. In this paper, I suggest that the labor market conditions for CEOs affect turnover outcomes. I use CEOs' positions on corporate executive and director networks to assess their employment options. Controlling for performance, firm characteristics, and personal traits, I find that CEO connectedness significantly increases turnover probability, especially for poor performers. I also show that connectedness increases the likelihood of CEOs leaving for other full-time positions, or their retiring and taking part-time positions elsewhere, but does not have a significant effect on the likelihood that they will step down and remain with the firm in other capacities. The evidence supports the idea that a CEO's connectedness expands outside options and thus increases turnover probability. © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G3 J4 L14