Repeated Implementation

نویسندگان

  • Ehud Kalai
  • John O. Ledyard
چکیده

In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. In this paper we provide an implementation “folk theorem”: for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.

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تاریخ انتشار 1997