On the Sequential Price of Anarchy of Isolation Games
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چکیده
10:10--11:50 117 Game Theory Minming Li New Bounds for the Balloon Popping Problem Vittorio Bilò, Davide Bilò On the Sequential Price of Anarchy of Isolation Games Anna Angelucci, Vittorio Bilò, Michele Flammini, Luca Moscardelli Social Exchange Networks with Distant Bargaining Konstantinos Georgiou, George Karakostas, Jochen Konemann, Zuzanna Stamirowska The 1/4-Core of the Uniform Bin Packing Game is Nonempty Xian Qiu, Walter Kern 211-212 Randomized Algorithms Bernard Mans On the Advice Complexity of the Online L(2,1)-coloring Problem on Paths and Cycles Maria Paola Bianchi, Hans-Joachim Böckenhauer, Juraj Hromkovic, Sacha Krug, Björn Steffen A Fast Algorithm for Data Collection along a Fixed Track Otfried Cheong, Radwa El Shawi, Joachim Gudmundsson Random Methods for Parameterized Problems Qilong Feng, Jianxin Wang, Shaohua Li, Jianer Chen
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تاریخ انتشار 2013