Skepticism and Foundations

Special foundations theories of justification can be contrasted with no-foundations theories. The two sorts of theories differ in the answers they give to the question, “Which of a person’s beliefs and inferential methods require justification in terms of other beliefs and/or methods?” No-foundations theories answer that all beliefs and methods require such justification. Special foundation’s theories answer that some beliefs and methods—the foundational beliefs and methods—do not require such justification and all other beliefs and methods require justification that ultimately terminates in foundational beliefs and methods. A third more conservative kind of theory, general foundationalism, answers that none of one’s beliefs and methods require such justification, at least in the absence of special reasons to distrust such beliefs or methods. My plan is to try to explain the issue that divides these views and to argue that the third conservative approach is the only one that is viable. In particular, intractable skeptical problems arise for the first two approaches that do not arise for the third. Internalist Justification I assume that justification has a normative significance. If S is not justified in believing B or using inferential process P , then S ought not to believe B