Strong comparative statics of equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Monotone Comparative Statics for Games With Strategic Substitutes
Under some conditions, parameterized games with strategic substitutes exhibit monotone comparative statics of equilibria. These conditions relate to a tradeoff between a direct parameter effect and an opposing, indirect strategic substitute effect. If the indirect effect does not dominate the direct effect, monotone comparative statics of equilibria are guaranteed. These conditions are availabl...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 42 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003