Existence of equilibria in discontinuous Bayesian games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We provide easily-verifiable sufficient conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game to guarantee the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayes–Nash equilibrium. We allow players’ payoff functions to be discontinuous in actions, and illustrate the usefulness of our results via an example of an all-pay auction with general tie-breaking rules which cannot be handled by extant results. © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C62; C72; D82
منابع مشابه
Symposium on: Existence of Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
This paper introduces the symposium on existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 162 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2016