Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
نویسندگان
چکیده
Article history: Received 26 October 2012 Available online 23 October 2015 JEL classification: J41 J24 D21
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 95 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2016