The Power of Sequential Single-Item Auctions for Agent Coordination

نویسندگان

  • Sven Koenig
  • Craig A. Tovey
  • Michail G. Lagoudakis
  • Evangelos Markakis
  • David Kempe
  • Pinar Keskinocak
  • Anton J. Kleywegt
  • Adam Meyerson
  • Sonal Jain
چکیده

Teams of robots are more fault tolerant than single robots, and auctions appear to be promising means for coordinating them. In a recent paper at “Robotics: Science and Systems 2005,” we analyzed a coordination system based on sequential single-item auctions. We showed that the coordination system is simple to implement and computation and communication efficient, and that the resulting sum of all travel distances in known terrain is guaranteed to be only a constant factor away from optimum. In this paper, we put these results in perspective by comparing our coordination system against those based on either parallel single-item auctions or combinatorial auctions, demonstrating that it combines the advantages of both.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Agent Coordination with Regret Clearing

Sequential single-item auctions can be used for the distributed allocation of tasks to cooperating agents. We study how to improve the team performance of sequential singleitem auctions while still controlling the agents in real time. Our idea is to assign that task to agents during the current round whose regret is large, where the regret of a task is defined as the difference of the second-sm...

متن کامل

Auction – Based Robot Coordination

We study how to improve sequential single-item auctions that assign targets to robots for exploration tasks such as environmental clean-up, space-exploration, and search and rescue missions. We exploit the insight that the resulting travel distances are small if the bidding and winner-determination rules are designed to result in hillclimbing, namely to assign an additional target to a robot in...

متن کامل

Strategic Bidding for Multiple Units in Simultaneous and Sequential Auctions

A consumer may be interested in buying a bundle of items, where any one item in the bundle may not be of particular interest. The emergence of online auctions allows such users to obtain bundles by bidding on different simultaneous or sequentially run auctions. Because the number of auctions and the number of combinations to form the bundles may be large, the bundle bidding problem becomes intr...

متن کامل

Sequential Single-Cluster Auctions for Robot Task Allocation

Multi-robot task allocation research has focused on sequential single-item auctions and various extensions as quick methods for allocating tasks to robots with small overall team costs. In this paper we outline the benefits of grouping tasks with positive synergies together and auctioning clusters of tasks rather than individual tasks. We show that with task-clustering the winner determination ...

متن کامل

A Comparative Study of Multi-Attribute Continuous Double Auction Mechanisms

Auctions have been as a competitive method of buying and selling valuable or rare items for a long time. Single-sided auctions in which participants negotiate on a single attribute (e.g. price) are very popular. Double auctions and negotiation on multiple attributes create more advantages compared to single-sided and single-attribute auctions. Nonetheless, this adds the complexity of the auctio...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2006