A Calculus for Cryptographic Protocols
نویسنده
چکیده
We introduce the spi calculus, an extension of the pi calculus designed for describing and analyzing cryptographic protocols. We show how to use the spi calculus, particularly for studying authentication protocols. The pi calculus (without extension) suffices for some abstract protocols; the spi calculus enables us to consider cryptographic issues in more detail. We represent protocols as processes in the spi calculus and state their security properties in terms of coarse-grained notions of protocol equivalence.
منابع مشابه
Framework for reasoning about cryptographic protocols with randomization
Context. Cryptographic protocols are distributed programs which use cryptographic primitives to secure communication over untrusted networks (such as the Internet). They are designed to achieve security properties such as confidentiality, authentication or anonymity. Due to the complexity of cryptographic primitives, the inherent concurrency and the untrusted nature of networks, their design ha...
متن کاملImproved SPI Calculus for Reasoning on Cryptographic Protocols
Most of cryptographic protocols are subjects to very subtle attacks. Therefore, many researchers have developed tools to model and analyze protocols to guarantee their security properties. The spi calculus has proved to be useful for analyzing and reasoning on cryptographic protocols. However, current works assumed that the spi calculus dealt with transferring a single unstructured message for ...
متن کاملA Bisimulation Method for Cryptographic Protocols
We introduce a definition of bisimulation for cryptographic protocols. The definition includes a simple and precise model of the knowledge of the environment with which a protocol interacts. Bisimulation is the basis of an effective proof technique, which yields proofs of classical security properties of protocols and also justifies certain protocol optimizations. The setting for our work is th...
متن کاملComposition of Cryptographic Protocols in a Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Process Calculus
We describe a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for analyzing cryptographic protocols and use it to derive compositionality properties of protocols in the presence of computationally bounded adversaries. We illustrate these concepts on oblivious transfer, an example from cryptography. We also compare our approach with a framework based on interactive Turing machines.
متن کاملA Top-Down Look at a Secure Message
In ongoing work, we are investigating the design of secure distributed implementations of high-level process calculi (in particular, of the join-calculus). We formulate implementations as translations to lower-level languages with cryptographic primitives. Cryptographic protocols are essential components of those translations. In this paper we discuss basic cryptographic protocols for transmitt...
متن کامل