- 1 - The Economics of Tacit Collusion
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منابع مشابه
Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly∗
We examine the economics literature on tacit collusion in oligopoly markets and take steps toward clarifying the relation between economists’ analysis of tacit collusion and those in the legal literature. We provide an example to motivate the idea that collusive profits can be achieved via tacit coordination in an environment where there is a unique, salient way for colluders to maximize and di...
متن کاملTacit collusion in the presence of cyclical demand and endogenous capacity levels
We analyze tacit collusion in an industry characterized by cyclical demand and long-run scale decisions; ...rms face deterministic demand cycles and choose capacity levels prior to competing in prices. Our focus is on the nature of prices. We ...nd that two types of price wars may exist. In one, collusion can involve periods of mixed strategy price wars. In the other, consistent with the Rotemb...
متن کاملExplicit Collusion and Market Share Allocations
We show that explicit cartels can implement market share allocations using a reporting framework that is considered to be legally acceptable for trade associations. This simple resolution of the market share cartels monitoring problem provides an explanation for the apparent prevalence of market share allocations relative to customer or geographic allocations by explicit cartels. Keywords: exp...
متن کاملModeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions
We study tacit collusion in repeated auctions in which bidders can only observe past winners and not their bids. We adopt a stringent interpretation of tacit collusion as collusion without communication about strategies that we model as a symmetry restriction on repeated game strategies: Strategies cannot discriminate among initially nameless bidders until they have become named through winning...
متن کاملDIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 Tacit Collusion in Auctions and Conditions for Its Facilitation and Prevention: Equilibrium Selection in Laboratory Experimental Markets
Tacit Collusion in Auctions and Conditions for Its Facilitation and Prevention: Equilibrium Selection in Laboratory Experimental Markets Jin Li Massachusetts Institute of Technology Charles R. Plott California Institute of Technology The paper studies bidder behavior in simultaneous, continuous, ascending price auctions. The purpose is to create (possibly extreme) conditions under which tacit c...
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تاریخ انتشار 2003