A Theory of Collusion in Multiple Object Simultaneous Auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
The choice of strategies by bidders who are allowed to communicate in auctions is studied. Using the tools of mechanism design, the possible outcomes of communication between bidders participating in a series of simultaneous first-price auctions are investigated. A variety of mechanisms are incentive compatible when side payments are not allowed. When attention is restricted to mechanisms that rely only on bidders’ ordinal ranking of markets, incentive compatibility is characterized and the ranking mechanism of Pesendorfer (1996) is interim incentive efficient.
منابع مشابه
How to Eliminate Collusion in Tenders and Auctions, using Game Theory (Determination of Ceiling and Floor Prices)
Governments and firms in accordance to their duties, obliged to inevitably contracts with Individuals and legal entities, especially in auction and tender process. Since, the law of conducting tenders and auctions is lacking efficiency and has major objection, therefore, this has led to the dissemination and development of areas of corruption in these contracts (through collusion). In this pape...
متن کاملCollusion via Signaling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities∗
Collusive equilibria exist in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects, even with large complementarities in the buyers’ utility functions. The bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. In the most collusive equilibrium the complementarities are never realized. The scope for collusion however narrows as the ratio between the number ...
متن کاملCollusion via Signaling in Multiple Object Auctions with Complementarities: an Experimental Test
We experimentally study bidder collusion in open ascending auctions for multiple objects. The project is based on the theoretical results by Brusco and Lopomo (1999), who give theoretical support for the following claims: (1) simultaneous ascending bid auctions can be vulnerable to collusion in the multi-object case; (2) The sole presence of complementarities does not hinder collusion; (3) Coll...
متن کاملDivision of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Collusion in Multiple Object Simultaneous Auctions: Theory and Experiments
The choice of strategies by bidders who are allowed to communicate in auctions is studied. Using the tools of mechanism design, the possible outcomes of communication between bidders participating in a series of simultaneous rst-price auctions are investigated. A variety of mechanisms are incentive compatible when side payments are not allowed. When attention is restricted to mechanisms that re...
متن کاملSimultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions
We analyze simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects in which bidders can be budget constrained. The presence of budget constraints shrinks the equilibrium set. A family of equilibria with a high degree of competition, as well as a family of equilibria with a high degree of collusion, disappear. When the budget available to each bidder is private information then even a very sma...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2002