Draft: Explanationist antirealism
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چکیده
Kyle Stanford has recently claimed to offer a new challenge to scientific realism. Taking his inspiration from the familiar Pessimistic Induction (PI), Stanford proposes a New Induction (NI). Contra the suggestion that the NI is a “red herring”, I argue that it reveals something deep and important about science. The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, which lies at the heart of the NI, yields a richer anti-realism than the PI. It explains why science falls short when it falls short, and so it might figure in the most coherent account of scientific practice. However, this best account will be antirealist in some respects and about some theories, but it will not be a sweeping antirealism about all or most of science. Kyle Stanford [Sta01][Sta06] claims to mount a new challenge to scientific realism. Taking his inspiration from the familiar Pessimistic Induction (PI), Stanford proposes a New Induction (NI). Anjan Chakravartty [Cha, §3] has recently called the NI a “red herring”, arguing that it poses no new problem for realism. I argue that this charge is unjustified. Moreover, the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives— which lies at the heart of the NI— yields a richer anti-realism than the PI. It explains why science falls short when it falls short, and so it might figure in the most coherent account of scientific practice. This antirealist element in our best explanatory account of science may ultimately be galling to realists, but it won’t be all wine and roses for antirealists either. In §1, I review the familiar Pessimistic Induction. In §2–§3, I discuss how best to understand Stanford’s New Induction. In §4, I consider the objection that the NI is a red herring. I argue that it is not. In §5, I suggest that the challenge Stanford mounts to realism leads to a richer account of science than previous arguments like the PI. ∗This paper grew out of a seminar at the University at Albany, SUNY. I want to thank all the participants, especially John Milanese and Elizabeth Gray. Thanks also to Gregory Frost-Arnold for discussions of related issues.
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تاریخ انتشار 2008