A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games
نویسندگان
چکیده
Jordan [2006] defined ‘pillage games’, a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator is represented by a ‘power function’ satisfying coalitional and resource monotonicity axioms. In this environment, he proved that stable sets must be finite. We provide a graph theoretical interpretation of the problem which tightens the finite bound to a Ramsey number. We also prove that the Jordan pillage axioms are independent.
منابع مشابه
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 40 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011