9301 Sharing with a Risk - Neutral Agent

2 Sharing with a Risk - Neutral Agent

In the classical principal–agent problem, a riskneutral agent bears all the risk. This particular solution, while acknowledged as a special case, is prominent in the minds of economists because the more general risk-averse case does not easily yield numerical results. For example, Jensen and Murphy (1990) find a divergence between the risk actually borne by chief executive officers and the risk...

Dynamic Costly State Veri cation

I study a model of dynamic risk sharing with costly state veri cation CSV In the model a risk neutral agent enters an in nitely repeated relationship with a risk averse agent In each period the risk averse agent receives a random income which is observed only by himself unless the risk neutral agent engages in costly monitoring I provide a set of characteriza tions for the optimal contract and ...

Time to lift the veil of secrecy.

Risk Management in Venture Capital Investor-Investee Relations

This paper provides an empirical analysis of risk handling arrangements adopted in the relationship between the venture capital investor and his investee. The theoretical framework adopted is principal-agent analysis, which views the investee as a risk averse agent entering into a risk sharing contract with the investor, a risk neutral (fully diversified) principal. The sample analysed is made ...

Incentive Mechanism for Knowledge Sharing in E-commerce Service Supply Chain: Complementarity, Integration and Risk Attitude

In the E-commerce Service Supply Chain (ESSC), knowledge sharing among members is crucial for fast responses to the changing online market. We propose a knowledge sharing incentive model for the ESSC by incorporating knowledge complementarity and integration capacity. We develop two principal-agent based optimal incentive mechanisms for the ESSC under asymmetric information, when service provid...