Enriching the Framework of Experimental Philosophy Final Draft-

Despite its historical neglect, intuition is currently a scholarly focus in such a broad range of behavioural and social sciences, as psychology, cognitive science, economics, education, medicine, management, and so forth. Moreover, intuition is expected to be a ‘fundamental bridging construct’ (Hodgkinson et al., 2008) to unify inquiries in these areas. Experimental philosophy – socio-experimental psychological research on intuitions about philosophical cases – may be reckoned part of this fascinating, interdisciplinary movement. Little attention, however, has been paid, in experimental philosophy, to the movement, since the prevailing practice of experimental philosophy is mainly modeled on the heuristics and biases approach (HB), i.e., one, albeit paradigmatic, restrictive approach to intuition among many. Thus, reconsidering the practice of experimental philosophy in light of other approaches to intuition will suggest further possible directions it can take, or so I shall argue. The paper consists of five parts. In Section 1, the concept(s) of intuition that both traditional and experimental philosophers make use of is described. In Section 2, the two main positions in experimental philosophy, experimental restrictivism (ER) and experimental descriptism (ES), are delineated. Then, I will describe the common framework shared by ER and ES, which stems from HB. In addition, I reconstruct ER’s arguments against the evidential value of philosophical intuition. The reconstruction reveals several commitments of ER. In Section 3, naturalistic decision making (NDM), another prominent approach to intuition, is introduced and compared with HB. In Section 4, I will