Pre-print Version Subject to Change - Please Do Not Quote without Author’s Permission Reasons for Action and Practical Reasoning

This paper seeks a better understanding of the elements of practical reasoning: premises and conclusion. It argues that the premises of practical reasoning do not normally include statements such as ‘I want to φ’; that the reasoning in practical reasoning is the same as it is in theoretical reasoning and that what makes it practical is, first, that the point of the relevant reasoning is given by the goal that the reasoner seeks to realize by means of that reasoning and the subsequent action; second, that the premises of such reasoning show the goodness of the action to be undertaken; third, that the conclusions of such reasoning may be actions or decisions, that can be accompanied by expressions of intention, either in action, or for the future; and that these are justified, and might be contradicted, in ways that are not only peculiar to them (i.e. in ways that diverge from those found in theoretical reasoning), but are distinctively practical, in that they involve reference to reasons for acting and to expressions of intention, respectively. This paper explores practical reasoning. In particular, it seeks a better understanding of the elements of practical reasoning (premises and conclusion) and their relation. These are large and much debated issues. I shall first focus on the question: ‘What are the premises of practical reasoning?’ and, towards the end of the paper, will say something about the conclusion of practical reasoning. As will become clear, my discussion is inspired in Elizabeth Anscombe’s remarks on practical reasoning in Intention and in her paper ‘Practical Inference’. A preliminary point. The term ‘practical reasoning’, one might think, is ambiguous, for it can be used to refer to the process of practical reasoning, or to the ‘content’ of that reasoning. I am not convinced by this ambiguity claim. At any rate, by ‘practical reasoning’ I shall here mean the reasoning that we, as rational agents, engage in. Engaging in such reasoning is taking certain statements as premises and, if all goes well, reaching a ‘practical’ conclusion, which has those premises as its grounds. So the questions I am concerned with can be put without ambiguity: what kind of statements play the role of premises when we engage in practical reasoning? And what is the conclusion of such reasoning? The premises of practical reasoning Many contemporary philosophers think the following gives the form of the most basic and simple piece of practical reasoning: