Approximating Equilibria in Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information and Multi-Unit Demand

نویسندگان

  • Amy Greenwald
  • Jiacui Li
  • Eric Sodomka
چکیده

Decision-making entities, whether they are businesses, governments, or individuals, usually interact in gametheoretic environments, in which the final outcome is tied to the actions taken by others in the environment. Auctions are examples of such game-theoretic environments with significant economic relevance. Internet advertising, of which a significant portion of transactions take place through online auctions, has increased 24 percent from 2010 to 2011, globally becoming an $85 billion industry. The FCC has conducted auctions for wireless spectrum since 1994, reaching sales of over $60 billion. Perishable commodities such as flowers are often sold via auction; the Dutch flower auctions had $5.7 billion in sales in 2011.

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تاریخ انتشار 2012