Computational Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation

ثبت نشده
چکیده

In this chapter, we will study the computational complexity of manipuation for three common voting rules. We will prove that the unweighted coalitional manipulation problem (Definition 3.1.2) is NP-complete for maximin (Section 4.1) and ranked pairs (Section 4.2), and we will give a polynomial-time algorithm for UCM for Bucklin (Section 4.3). 4.1 Manipulation for Maximin is NP-complete In this section, we prove that the UCM problem for maximin is NP-complete. The proof uses a reduction from the two vertex disjoint paths in directed an-tisymmetric graph problem, which is known to be NP-complete (Fortune et al., 1980). Definition 4.1.1. The two vertex disjoint paths in directed graph problem is defined as follows. We are given a directed graph G and two disjoint pairs of vertices Ôu, u ½ Õ and Ôv, v ½ Õ, where u, u ½ , v, v ½ are all different from each other. We 48

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under the Borda Rule Is NP-Hard

The Borda voting rule is a positional scoring rule where, for m candidates, for every vote the first candidate receives m− 1 points, the second m− 2 points and so on. A Borda winner is a candidate with highest total score. It has been a prominent open problem to determine the computational complexity of UNWEIGHTED COALITIONAL MANIPULATION UNDER BORDA: Can one add a certain number of additional ...

متن کامل

Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under Some Common Voting Rules

Understanding the computational complexity of manipulation in elections is arguably the most central agenda in Computational Social Choice. One of the influential variations of the the problem involves a coalition of manipulators trying to make a favorite candidate win the election. Although the complexity of the problem is well-studied under the assumption that the voters are weighted, there w...

متن کامل

Manipulation Can Be Hard in Tractable Voting Systems Even for Constant-Sized Coalitions

Voting theory has become increasingly integrated with computational social choice and multiagent systems. Computational complexity has been extensively used as a shield against manipulation of voting systems, however for several voting schemes this complexity may cause calculating the winner to be computationally difficult. Of the many voting systems that have been studied with regard to electi...

متن کامل

Coalitional Voting Manipulation: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

Computational social choice literature has successfully studied the complexity of manipulation in various voting systems. However, the existing models of coalitional manipulation view the manipulating coalition as an exogenous input, ignoring the question of the coalition formation process. While such analysis is useful as a first approximation, a richer framework is required to model voting ma...

متن کامل

Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting1

We investigate the computational aspects of safe manipulation, a new model of coalitional manipulation that was recently put forward by Slinko and White [11]. In this model, a potential manipulator v announces how he intends to vote, and some of the other voters whose preferences coincide with those of v may follow suit. Depending on the number of followers, the outcome could be better or worse...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2011