Tariff concessions in production sourcing
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we study a multi-stage production sourcing problem where tariff concessions can be exploited at the firm level using free trade agreements between countries. To solve the problem, an algorithm which embeds a very large-scale neighborhood (VSLN) search into a simulated annealing framework is developed. A numerical study is conducted to verify the effectiveness of the solution approach.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- European Journal of Operational Research
دوره 187 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008