Bargaining, binding contracts, and competitive wages
نویسنده
چکیده
In an analysis of a model where many workers bargain with a ...rm and sign binding contracts, we show existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. If the production function satis...es decreasing returns, each worker receives a share of his marginal product (treating all other workers as employed) in equilibrium. Thus, wages are competitive. This is in contrast to Stole and Zweibel (1996), who assume that contracts are non-binding and ...nd that the payo¤ of a worker is a weighted average of the inframarginal contributions. Hence, binding contracts imply lower wages than non-binding contracts.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 43 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003