Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth

In order to shed light on the question of whether reliabilism entails or excludes certain kinds of truth theories, I examine two arguments that purport to establish that reliabilism cannot be combined with antirealist and epistemic theories of truth. I take antirealism about truth to be the denial of the recognition-transcendence of truth, and epistemic theories to be those that identify truth with some kind of positive epistemic status. According to one argument, reliabilism and antirealism are incompatible because the former takes epistemic justification to be recognition-transcendent in a certain sense that conflicts with the latter s denial of the recognition-transcendence of truth. I show that, because the recognition-transcendence of reliabilist justification is significantly weaker than the recognition-transcendence required by a realist conception of truth, antirealist theories of truth that deny the strong transcendence of truth do not threaten the externalist character of reliabilism. According to the second argument, reliabilism cannot be combined with an epistemic truth theory because reliabilists analyze positive epistemic status in terms of truth but epistemic theorists analyze truth in terms of positive epistemic status. However, I argue that reliabilists who wish to adopt an epistemic theory of truth can avoid circularity by appealing to a multiplicity of positive epistemic statuses. According to generic reliabilism, beliefs are justified just when they are produced by cognitive processes that are highly reliable or truthconducive. The more reliable the process is that produces a belief, the more justified the belief will be. The less reliable the process, the less justified the belief. Because of the important role that truth plays both in generic reliabilism and in other theories that include reliability as one component of justification or warrant, it is important to know whether these epistemological theories require or exclude certain kinds of truth theories. In this article I examine two arguments that purport to establish that antirealist and epistemic theories of truth cannot be combined with reliabilism. I show that both arguments fail. Although there are various forms of realism and antirealism about truth, for the Erkenntnis (2007) 66:375–391 Springer 2007 DOI 10.1007/s10670-007-9042-5