On the notion of reconstruction of quantum theory

What belongs to quantum theory is no more than what is needed for its derivation. We argue for an approach focusing on reconstruction rather than interpretation of quantum mechanics. After discussing the concept of reconstruction, we analyze the problem of metatheoretic justification of the choice of axioms and then study several examples of reconstruction. 1 What is wrong with interpreting quantum mechanics? Ever since the first days of quantum mechanics physicists as well as philosophers tried to interpret it, understanding this task as a problem of giving to the new, puzzling physical theory a clear meaning. Looking globally, this enterprize failed: still today we have no consensus on what the meaning of quantum theory is. Proposed answers are many but none of them has won overall recognition. Perhaps the most remarkable manifestation of the failure to interpret quantum mechanics is the attitude taught to most young physicists in lecture rooms and research laboratories in the last half century, “Write down equations and calculate! No need to ask questions!” Why did attempts at univocal interpretation fail? Many answers are possible, and among them we favor two, both showing that there is an intrinsic deficiency in the idea of interpreting philosophically a physical theory. The first answer is that to a physical theory one would naturally like to give a physical meaning in the Greek sense of φύσις, i.e. we – as part of the physicists’ audience – expect to be told a story about the immanent, fundamental nature.