Determination of Stackelberg–Nash equilibria using a sensitivity based approach
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چکیده
A sensitivity based approach is presented to determine Nash solution(s) in multiobjective problems modeled as a non-cooperative game. The proposed approach provides an approximation to the rational reaction set (RRS) for each player. An intersection of these sets yields the Nash solution for the game. An alternate approach for generating the RRS based on design of experiments (DOE) combined with response surface methodology (RSM) is also explored. The two approaches for generating the RRS are compared on three example problems to find Nash and Stackelberg solutions. For the examples presented, it is seen that the proposed sensitivity based approach (i) requires less computational effort than a RSMDOE approach, (ii) is less prone to numerical errors than the RSM-DOE approach, (iii) has the ability to find multiple Nash solutions when the Nash solution is not a singleton, (iv) is able to approximate nonlinear RRS, and (v) on one example problem, found a Nash solution better than the one reported in the literature. 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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تاریخ انتشار 2016