How Democratic Alliances Solve the Power Parity Problem

Why do challengers attack some states that have allies, while avoiding conflict with others? This paper builds upon previous research by arguing that parity in the observable capabilities of opposing states and their allies generates greater uncertainty and miscalculations on the part of challengers, leading to a higher probability of conflict. Unlike previous research, however, I argue that military alliances among democracies are better able to overcome this uncertainty, making power distributions largely irrelevant. The results demonstrate that uncertainty generated at power parity is mitigated when a target state’s allies are more democratic, resulting in no overall change in the probability of conflict. This study therefore emphasizes that the effectiveness of military alliances lies not necessarily in their aggregation of power, but in their ability to coordinate their power and communicate this coordination to potential challengers. University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, 450B Fretwell Bldg., 9201 University City Blvd., Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 ([email protected]). D R A FT C O PY International relations scholars have long agreed that uncertainty is an important cause of international conflict. States go to great lengths to either communicate or misrepresent their capabilities and resolve when bargaining with other states. Uncertainty about the bargaining range, in turn, can result in mistakes and miscalculations that raise the probability of conflict. Yet few studies in international relations have attempted to explicitly model uncertainty in conflict situations, instead focusing on the mean causal effects of institutional, behavioral and systemic variables. And no studies exist which explicitly model the role of military alliances in managing uncertainty, despite the fact that the purpose of most alliances is to deter aggression by reducing uncertainty about the probability of victory. A wide sample of the literature concludes that alliances ultimately lead to fewer wars, while others have found that the presence of an alliance frequently leads to conflict expansion. More recently, Leeds and Gibler and Vasquez show that the specific content of an alliance agreement ultimately influences the probability of conflict. These diverse findings suggest that not all alliances are equal in their ability to manage uncertainty on the part of a potential challenger. Why, then, do challengers attack some states that have allies, while avoiding conflict with others? This paper builds upon previous research by arguing that the observable capabilities of states and their alliance partners generate greater levels of uncertainty for potential challengers when there is power parity. In such a scenario, the unobservable characteristics of a target state and its allies, such as the resolve and the reliability of the allies, are more relevant to a challenger’s decision making process. This reliance on unobservables E.g., Blainey 1988; Fearon 1995; Powell 2006; Schelling 1960. Fearon 1995;Schelling 1966. Morrow 2000; Snyder 1997. Huth 1996; Levy 1981; Morgenthau 1967; Singer and Small 1966, 1968; Waltz 1979. Christensen and Snyder 1990; Kegley and Raymond 1994; Siverson and Starr 1991; Wayman 1984. 2003; 2005. 1998. Reed 2003.