Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Effects of Communication Among Taxpayers on Compliance
T axpayer audits are a central feature of the voluntary compliance system in the United States Federal individual income tax. Audits are thought to have a direct deterrent effect on the individuals actually audited. In addition, audits are believed to have an indirect deterrent effect on individuals not audited, and there is some empirical evidence that suggests that changes in audit rates affe...
متن کاملTax enforcement in an agent-based model with endogenous audits
We generalize the classic Allingham and Sandmo’s model of tax evasion considering heterogeneous agents with different degrees of tax morale and matchable, as opposed to non-matchable, income. The Tax Agency evolves its control scheme, maximizing the revenues from fines, and takes into account some minimal information on the taxpayers. We compare different audit policies and find that the most e...
متن کاملAmbiguity about Audit Probability, Tax Compliance, and Taxpayer Welfare
We show that an increase in uncertainty about the probability of being audited (ambiguity) increases tax compliance for ambiguity-averse taxpayers but reduces compliance for ambiguity lovers. Because experimental evidence reveals considerable heterogeneity with respect to ambiguity preferences, we conclude that fostering uncertainty about the probability of being audited may not be an effective...
متن کاملStatistics from Simulations A.1 Statistical Inference and Estimation of Population Parameters
When the goal is to estimate the parameter of some population (e.g., mean or variance), the usual procedure is to design a probability sample to provide a sample statistic. As an example, we might estimate the parameter ‘true average cost’ of an inventory system (population mean, ) with the statistic ‘average cost for 12 months’ (sample mean, x ); or we might estimate the proportion of taxpayer...
متن کاملCan strategic uncertainty help deter tax evasion? An experiment on auditing rules
This paper adds to the economic-psychological research on tax compliance by experimentally testing a simple auditing rule that induces strategic uncertainty among taxpayers. Under this rule, termed the bounded rule, taxpayers are informed of the maximum number of audits by a tax authority, so that the audit probability depends on the joint decisions among the taxpayers. We compare the bounded r...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2016