PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ Comments on Ismael’s “Doublemindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture”
نویسنده
چکیده
Two general worries are raised for the dual content approach to consciousness as presented by Ismael in “Doublemindedness”. First, it is argued that something much like Ismael’s proposed explanations of subjectivity and the explanatory gap can be given in terms of phenomenal concepts rather than in terms of dual content. Furthermore, selfrepresentation alone does not explain the “determinacy” and substantiveness of phenomenal concepts (or presentational content). The notion of “presentational content” and its use in explaining the subjectivity of experience seems at least as mysterious as subjectivity itself, and may in fact presuppose it.
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