Running Head : Self - Regulation and Choice

Effortful choice is costly, but so is accommodating to choices made by others. In five studies, participants who made a series of choices regarding consumer products, college courses, or course materials subsequently showed poorer self-regulation (measured in terms of task persistence, task performance, and pain tolerance), as compared to people who viewed or rated similar options without making choices. In two additional studies, people were better at self-regulation (measured in terms of physical stamina and speed-accuracy trade-offs) after they had performed a task they had chosen, as compared to performing a task chosen by others. A limited resource model can explain why people regard choice-making as stressful yet generally prefer to have choices. Self-Regulation and Choice, p. 3 “The difficulty in life is the choice.” --George Moore, The Bending of the Bough, 1900 The rich complexity of human social life is partly attributable to choice. Each day, millions of people make decisions that will have lasting effects on their lives. Although choices are often described as painful, agonizing, difficult, and by other terms that connote adversity, people who lack choices tend to see their situations as even more aversive. Indeed, the restriction of freedom (through jailing or other confinements) has long been used in human society as a severe form of punishment. Conversely, the worldwide shift toward democracy that has been one great theme of the late 20 century (Fukuyama, 1992) can be seen as a broad-based insistence on having more choices. There is no denying that choices have proliferated, in terms of the number of decisions one can make in life or even throughout a day. The diversity of product selection has expanded exponentially, such that the average American supermarket in 1976 carried 9,000 different products, whereas fifteen years later that figure had ballooned to 30,000 (Waldman, 1992). The average produce section alone had risen from 65 items to 285 items. The coffee shop chain Starbucks boasted in 2003 that it offered each customer 19,000 “beverage possibilities” at every store, and this was before their new “superheated” option multiplied the number even further. Approximately 50,000 new products are introduced every year in the U.S., whereas the number 30 years ago was only a few thousand. Has the proliferation of choice uniformly made life easier and better? Iyengar and Lepper (2000) found that people who had more choices were often less willing to decide to buy anything at all, and their subsequent satisfaction was lower when they had been confronted with 24 or 30 options than when they faced six options. Such findings suggest that choice, to the extent that it requires greater decision-making among options, can become burdensome and ultimately counterproductive. Schwartz (2000) denounced the stresses and others costs of increased choice as “the tyranny of freedom.” We thus have a potential paradox. People who lack choices seem to want them and often will fight for them. Then again, people find that making many choices can be aversive. The purpose of the present manuscript was to test two seemingly competing hypotheses about choice, derived from a Self-Regulation and Choice, p. 4 limited resource model of psychological functioning. The first hypothesis centers around decision fatigue: the notion that making choices can be effortful and can therefore deplete resources. The second hypothesis is that when one does not have choice, even though one might be spared the depleting effect of choosing, one may have to expend resources to adjust oneself to unchosen circumstances. Thus, we propose that choice is a two-sided coin for executive functioning: Making choices is taxing, but so is accommodating to the choices of others. Choice and Control By some analyses, human life is full of constant choices, insofar as an alternative is available to nearly every action (Sartre, 1956). We use the term choice in a more limited sense, however, to refer to choices made by a conscious consideration among alternatives. Most of the time people proceed by routine, habit, and automatic processes (Bargh, 1989; Bargh & Thein, 1985). To say that a professor chooses to go to her office each day, because in principle she could stay home or get another job is misleading in our view: Most likely she does not go through a conscious consideration of alternatives each day. Our point is simply that the contemplation of alternatives and selection among them is a meaningful and effortful psychological act. It is a form of exerting control: One can decide the outcome of a particular situation. Indeed, in some views the capacity to make flexible choices based on new information is one of the driving forces behind the evolution of basic cognitive processes (Tomasello & Call, 1997). That is, simple organisms behaved according to fixed action patterns, by which their biological programming dictates a single and inflexible response. More complex organisms may act on the basis of operant conditioning, so that current behavior is somewhat flexibly shaped by prior consequences of like behavior. The most advanced form of choosing involves weighing information about currently available options to select the option that seems most promising. This response would be the most flexible, and potentially the most adaptive in terms of promoting survival and reproduction, but it requires the most elaborate information-processing apparatus and the most pliant behavior control system — so, in a sense, it is costly. Self-Regulation and Choice, p. 5 Strength and Ego Depletion Recent findings have begun to suggest that many of the self’s activities depend on a common resource, akin to energy or strength. The self’s executive function is the agent that makes choices and decisions, initiates and controls action, and regulates the self by operating on its inner states (see Baumeister, 1998). All of these important activities seem to draw on this common resource, which may easily become depleted. We define self-regulation as the self exerting control to change its own responses in an attempt to pursue goals and standards. These responses include changing one’s emotional state, regulating thought processes, persisting at a task despite a strong desire to quit, and overriding impulses. The goals and standards include ideals, morals, norms, performance targets, and the expectations of other people. A series of studies has provided evidence that some psychological resource is depleted by acts of regulating the self. Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister (1998) and Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice (1998) showed that performing one act of regulating the self impaired performance on a subsequent, seemingly unrelated act of self-control. For example, resisting temptation, stifling emotional distress, or suppressing thoughts caused people to quit earlier on a frustrating task, show less physical stamina, and be unable to refrain from laughing at a humorous scene. Presumably, the first act of self-control depleted some resource that would have been needed to perform better at the second act of self-control. Depletion of the self’s resources has been linked to multiple behavioral problems, including overeating by dieters (Vohs & Heatherton, 2000), prejudicial responding (Richeson & Shelton, 2003), inappropriate self-presentation (Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco, in press), and intellectual underachievement (Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003). These studies of self-regulation are relevant because they involve the self’s executive function, which is to say the inner agency that exerts control and also makes choices. Baumeister et al. (1998) suggested that the resource involved in self-regulation might be the same one needed for other activities of the executive function, such as choice-making. In one study, making a responsible choice to perform a counterattitudinal behavior (as in dissonance research; Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967) Self-Regulation and Choice, p. 6 depleted the ego resource, as shown by quitting more rapidly on a subsequent figure-tracing task. Although encouraging, those results do not amount to a strong or clear test of the view that making choices depletes the self’s resources. The reliance on a dissonance procedure could entail that dissonance-reduction processes were activated, and these could have depleted the self’s resources. Dissonance often invokes a sense of responsibility for undesirable consequences (Linder et al., 1967), and this also may have drained the self’s inner strength. Hence the focus of the present investigation was to establish the role of the self’s resources (specifically self-regulatory strength) in choice. The strength model of the self’s executive function has two aspects relevant to the present discussion. First, this resource is used for a broad variety of regulated activities. The same resource is used for controlling thoughts, modifying emotions, overriding impulses, performance regulation, as well as active choosing. Second, this executive resource is fairly limited, so that even relatively small expenditures translate into an impaired ability to execute executive responses later. Choice Can Be Depleting The current work tests the hypothesis that there is a hidden cost to choosing beyond responsibility for outcomes and thinking about options. Specifically, the process of choosing may itself drain some of the self’s precious resources, thereby leaving the executive function less capable of carrying out its other activities. Decision fatigue can therefore impair self-regulation. A thought-provoking review paper by Burger (1989) concluded that the quest for choice and control is in reality somewhat limited. In many situations, people prefer not to have control, such as when someone else can do the job better. Individual differences are also apparent: Burger pointed out that even in conditions in which most people prefer control, there is generally a minority of people who choose not to have control. It seems that for these people, the burden of responsibility that goes with choice is simply too great. Even when the burden seems trivial, some people still want to avoid it. There are multiple reasons people may seek to avoid choice, not the least of which is reluctance to be held responsible for negative outcomes stemming from one’s decision. Another reason, however, may be that the decision process itself is costly, insofar as it consumes valuable resources. In Self-Regulation and Choice, p. 7 particular, people may avoid choosing so as not to conserve their powers of self-regulation and other executive functions. This valuable resource is limited, and so conserving it when possible would be prudent. If choosing depletes this resource, it would be adaptive for the self to pass up unnecessary choosing, unless one is certain that there will be no further demands on the self for a while. There are several reasons to think that choosing would deplete the self’s strength. Selfregulation presumably consumes resources because the self must override one response and then substitute a different response, and energy is needed to perform these interrupt and initiate functions. Choosing may also involve an energy-consuming transition. The Rubicon model of action (Gollwitzer, 1996) outlines two mindsets that people move through serially. The deliberative mindset allows the person to consider and weigh various options and the implemental mindset enables the person to pursue the selected course of action. To move from the first mental mode to the second involves a termination of the deliberating process and then an initiation of actions in pursuit of the chosen option. In that sense, choosing is also not equivalent to the cognitive process of deliberating. The philosopher Searle (2002) has discussed this difference at some length and argues that rationality presupposes some degree of free will (or purposeful control over behavior) because rational analysis is functionally useless unless one can act based on the outcome of the analysis. Searle further emphasized that people can recognize multiple reasons to behave in a certain way but still not perform the behavior, again indicating that contemplating and choosing are separable steps. Converging evidence comes from Damasio (1994), a neuropsychologist who observed that certain brain-damaged patients with emotional deficits can and do engage in sophisticated (and accurate) cognitive deliberations, such as lengthy ruminations about the costs and benefits of several options — but they often cannot bring themselves to finally make a choice. In sum, we reasoned that making a choice involves a particular intrapsychic act. This step, which in some way commits the person to a course of action, requires an effortful inner process. As such, we hypothesize that it consumes some of the self’s limited supply of energy, thereby rendering the resource less available for future self-directed activities. The first series of studies in this Self-Regulation and Choice, p. 8 investigation was designed to test the hypothesis that acts of choice would produce a state of ego depletion that would be discernible in impaired self-regulation subsequently. Lack of Choice Can Also Be Depleting It is also clear that people like to have choices. Choice and control reduce the stress of outcomes and make life situations more agreeable (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1995; A. Campbell, 1981; Glass, Singer, & Friedman, 1969). Deprived of choice and control, people exhibit strong negative reactions, ranging from learned helplessness to aggressive reactance (Brehm, 1966; Seligman, 1975). They may also respond to a lack of control by developing illusions of control (Langer, 1975) or by seeking alternative, secondary forms of control (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). Most broadly, one trend in world history is an overall increase in choice, including the proliferation of consumer options, the shift from parentally-arranged marriages to self-chosen partners, and the political revolutions and movements in which people vociferously demand more (never less) freedom. Whatever the drawbacks or burdens of choosing, people want to be able to choose, and they express a corresponding dislike of situations where they have no control or no choice. The strength model of the self’s executive function can offer an explanation for some of the negative effects of lacking choice. Rothbaum et al. (1982) distinguished between primary and secondary control, which were aimed at creating harmony between self and environment. Primary control involves altering the environment to suit the self, whereas secondary control involves altering the self to fit the environment. Secondary control therefore depends heavily on self-regulation, insofar as it entails changing the self. When the self lacks choices or control, it must generally accept the environment as it is and consequently its main option for creating harmony with the environment is to alter the self. This strategy requires energy and effort because, by definition, the external world is not aligned with the self’s preferences. In principle, there could be an ideal solution: Someone else would choose for you exactly what you would most like to have, and thus you would be relieved of the burden of choosing while also getting just what you want. Some people may expect their parents or romantic partners to perform that Self-Regulation and Choice, p. 9 function (cf. Iyengar & Lepper, 1999), but in practice it is unclear how consistently this solution works. Hence when one does not have choice, one must adjust oneself to accommodate to the dictates of other people or external demands. Consequently, we expect that the self-regulation required for this type of adjustment should be depleting. Hence, we tested a second hypothesis in this paper related to the depletion resulting from selfchosen versus other-chosen activities. We predicted that when choices are made for oneself by someone else, self resources will become depleted by the attempt to accommodate to the assigned course of action, even though one was spared the regulatory strain of choosing. Present Investigation This investigation sought to demonstrate both the costs and benefits of having choice. Experiments 1-5 were conducted to address the first hypothesis, of whether acts of decision-making tax the regulatory system. Experiments 1-4 took place in the laboratory, and in these studies participants in the crucial condition were instructed to make a series of choices. The choices were made meaningful and personally relevant. Afterward, self-regulatory resource depletion was assessed by having participants perform a task that required self-control. We predicted that those who made many choices in the first task would be more depleted and therefore perform worse on the second task, relative to those who had not made frequent choices earlier. Experiment 5 was a naturalistic study in which participants at a shopping mall were asked about the extent to which they had engaged in decision-making throughout their shopping trip that day. Subsequently, shoppers’ performance on a self-control task was measured. We predicted that making many personally involving choices would result in subsequent impairments in self-regulation. Experiments 6-7 were conducted to address the second hypothesis, that performing an act that was chosen by someone else would be more depleting than a self-chosen act. Participants were given the choice to perform a task or were assigned to it; later, self-regulatory resource depletion was assessed by asking them to engage in a self-control task. We predicted that participants who did not choose their earlier task would have poorer regulatory abilities and therefore be less effective during Self-Regulation and Choice, p. 10 the subsequent regulatory task, compared to those who had chosen their earlier task. EXPERIMENT 1 Experiment 1 was a preliminary study designed to justify the assumptions behind the choice procedure that was to be used in Experiments 2-4, and it also validated a self-report measure for in Experiment 5. In Experiment 1, we assigned people either to make a series of binary choices between products or to report their usage of the same products, in order to confirm that people do make more effortful, self-involving choices in the high choice condition than in the no-choice condition. The choice condition was designed to mimic some aspects of choosing in everyday life. In daily life, most people make a multitude of minor choices. (Of course, people do make major, momentous choices such as whether to marry or divorce, but for ethical and pragmatic reasons we did not include such momentous choices in the present studies.) Some of these choices have consequences, such as the dieter’s decision to pass up the fresh fruit and instead devour the fattening dessert, whereas others have few or no consequences, such as deciding to wear the black rather than the gray skirt with the white blouse. In Experiment 1, participants in the high choice condition were asked to make a multitude of choices between products, and at least one of these choices would determine which item they would receive. Thus, participants’ choices had potentially real (though relatively minor) outcomes. Method Participants Participants were 34 undergraduate students (20 male) who participated in exchange for partial course credit. Procedure Participants were randomly assigned either to make choices or rate products. They were given a list of 60 specific varieties of products, such as colored pens, scented candles, popular magazines, and colored t-shirts. Participants in the no choice condition were asked to read and rate the products on the extent to which they had used each product in the past (on a scale from 1-5, from never to very often). Self-Regulation and Choice, p. 11 Participants in the choice condition were asked to read the list of products, but they were also instructed to choose between two different versions of each product (e.g., between a white t-shirt and a black t-shirt; a red pen or a purple pen). Subsequently, participants completed the state version of the Positive and Negative Affectivity Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and also an 8-item questionnaire that served as the manipulation check of the methods. Two items asked participants about the extent to which participants engaged in choice-making during the products task, three items asked about the amount of consideration, deliberation, and thinking that participants put into the task, one item tapped the extent to which responses to the product task were of participants’ own choosing, and one final item asked how tired participants felt. The first seven items were designed to tap into the different aspects of choice-making that are important in the depletion of self-resources; the last item on tiredness was included to see if participants reported feeling more tired after making multiple choices. After completing the product task questionnaire, participants were debriefed and thanked. Results and Discussion A factor analysis of the eight items showed that one factor accounted for 43% of the variance in the unrotated solution (eigenvalue = 3.46), whereas the second factor (eigenvalue = 1.27) accounted for an additional 16% of variance. Inspection of the varimax-rotated solution showed that 7 items loaded onto one factor at over .55, whereas item 8 (How tired do you feel?) loaded onto a second factor (i.e., item 8 loaded at -.001 onto Factor 1 and at .86 on Factor 2). Accordingly, we aggregated the first 7 items into one factor that tapped involvement of self in choosing and left the eighth item on its own to represent the second factor of feeling tired. Coefficient alpha for the entire scale was satisfactory, α = .75. A t-test with condition as predictor and the dependent measure of involvement of self (i.e., scale items 1-7) revealed the predicted effect of condition, t (32) = 2.43, p = .02. Participants in the choice condition (M = 43.63, SD = 7.09) reported that they were more involved and made more choices during their task than did participants in the frequency (no choice) condition, (M = 36.06, SD = 10.52). Self-Regulation and Choice, p. 12 Reports of feeling tired did not, however, vary with condition, t (32) < 1, p = ns (M = 3.31; SD = 2.44 versus M = 3.22, SD = 2.02). There was a significant difference in the length of time it took each group to complete their task, t (32) = 3.36, p < .01. The choices task took about a minute longer (M = 210.32 seconds; SD = 65.98) than did the frequency rating task (M = 146.32 seconds; SD = 44.02). Analyses showed, however, that time spent on the task did not predict scores on Factor 1 (items 1-7) of the involvement of self measure, r (34) = .10, ns. Furthermore, an ANCOVA with time spent on the product ratings task as a covariate confirmed that differences in length of time did not account for differences on Factor 1 of the choices measure, F (1, 31) < 1, but rather condition remained a significant predictor in this model, F (1, 31) = 6.01, p = .02. As mentioned, participants’ first charge after completing the product ratings task was to complete the PANAS to determine whether mood differed as a consequence of choosing versus rating products. A t-test showed that condition did not affect positive affect (PA; M choices = M = 24.31, SD = 7.09; M frequency = 25.05, SD = 6.61) or negative affect reports (NA; M choices = 13.19, SD = 4.45; M frequency = 11.89, SD = 2.25), t (32) = .32, ns. Thus, we can rule out differences in mood as a function of condition. In sum, the choice procedure led to higher ratings of psychological involvement than the mere rating task. Participants who made choices among products reported being more self-involved in the task, relative to participants who rated the frequency with which they had used the products, which presumably required only conjuring up past instances of use in memory and making a Likert-scale judgment of usage. EXPERIMENT 2 Experiment 2 provided the first test of our hypothesis that making choices depletes the self’s resources. Experiment 1 confirmed that our procedure of having people make a series of binary choices was perceived by participants as making more demands on the self than the low-choice procedure (of merely rating the same products). Our theory holds that such effortful, involving choices will deplete Self-Regulation and Choice, p. 13 the self’s resources, and that this depletion could be seen in impaired performance on a self-regulation task. Hence in the following three studies (Experiments 2 – 4), the choice (or no choice) manipulation was followed by a self-regulation task that had no obvious connection with the product-rating task. In the current study, the choice versus ratings task was followed by the cold pressor task, which has been deemed a valid measure of self-control (Litt, 1988). Experiment 2 also included several features that deserve comment. First, the choice manipulation and the dependent measure were administered by separate experimenters and presented as separate experiments. We used two different experimenters to ameliorate the possibility that participants would try to perform well on the self-control task in order to get a better gift from the experimenter (which was promised as the result of the choice versus rating procedure). Second, the experimenter for the dependent measure was kept blind to condition, which eliminates the possibility of unknowingly biasing the results via demand characteristics. Third, the cold pressor task requires participants to hold their non-dominant hand and most of their lower arm (to the elbow) in frigid water for as long as possible. We understand self-control as overriding one’s habitual, normal, or natural response (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996), and so in this case people had to override their normal tendency to recoil and pull one’s arm out of the near-freezing water. Thus, we predicted that people who had made choices among products would not be able to overcome this impulse as well as would no choice (rating) participants. Method Participants Twenty-five (16 female) undergraduates participated in exchange for partial course credit. Procedure Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: a choice task or a no choice task. In the choice condition, participants made a long series of choices between products, both within and across categories, much the same as in Experiment 1. For example, 11 colors of t-shirts were displayed on the table in front of the participants, each labeled with a letter code. Participants made similar Self-Regulation and Choice, p. 14 choices between items in the following categories: scented candles, t-shirt sizes, shampoo brands, candy, and types of socks. After choosing preferred items within each product category, participants then chose between different categories of products. Participants were encouraged to “think carefully about each choice, because you will be given a free gift at the end of the experiment based in part on the preferences you indicate here.” In the no choice condition, participants recorded their thoughts, feelings, and/or opinions about each of eight advertisements taken from popular magazines. Thus, in both the choice and no choice conditions, people were asked to rate products, but only in the choice condition were people asked to make choice decisions. Participants in the no choice condition were also informed that they would be given the opportunity to select a free gift for themselves at the end of the experiment. They were also told that the same options were presented to all participants. Following the manipulation (choice task or no choice task), participants were escorted to another room, where a second experimenter administered the cold pressor task. This experimenter was blind to participants’ earlier experimental condition. For the cold pressor task, water temperature was maintained at 1 degree Celsius (about 34 degrees Fahrenheit) using a mixture of ice and water. An aquarium pump was used to circulate the water continually to prevent a warm pocket of water from forming around the participant’s hand. The room air temperature was also maintained at a constant 72 degrees Fahrenheit (22 degrees Celsius). Participants first held their hand and lower arm in room temperature water for one minute to ensure an equal starting point before putting their arm in the ice water. Using the standard directions that qualify the cold pressor task as a measure of self-control, the experimenter asked the participant to put his or her arm into the water up to the elbow and hold it there for as long as possible. The experimenter used a stopwatch to measure the length of time the participant held his or her arm in the water. This number (in seconds) served as the measure of selfcontrol. After completing the cold pressor task, participants were fully debriefed, given an opportunity to choose a free gift, and thanked. Self-Regulation and Choice, p. 15 Results and Discussion Experiment 2 supported the hypothesis that making a series of choices depletes a valuable resource, leaving the self subsequently less effective at self-regulation. The self-regulation measure in this study involved holding one’s hand in unpleasantly cold water. Participants who had made a series of choices quit earlier on the task (by pulling their hands out of the water) relative to participants in the no choice condition, F (1, 23) = 5.97, p < .025 (see Table 1). The main effect for choice remained significant when relevant controls were entered into an ANCOVA (trait self-control x gender, with time taken on the choice vs no choice task as covariate), F (1, 19) = 5.77, p < .03. The resource needed to enable oneself to persist in holding one’s hand in frigid water was apparently depleted by the process of making a series of choices. Persistence on the cold pressor task was not confounded with time spent on the first task. The product rating task did not take any longer than the choosing task, F (1, 23) = 1.76, ns. Participants in the no choice condition in fact took slightly more time (M = 26.92 min) than participants in the choice condition (M = 24.39 min). Thus, the results cannot be explained as due to greater elapsed time, hurry to leave, or overall tedium in the choice condition. It was not the length of time that people spent on the task that was depleting. Rather, it was the act of making decisions itself that left people less able to persist. The design of Experiment 2 bolstered the findings by ruling out several alternative explanations. We used two experimenters in the current study, one to administer the dependent measure and one to administer the product task. Moreover, the experimenter overseeing the dependent measure was blind to condition, thereby eliminating concern that experimenter demand could have contributed to the results. Also, no choice participants in the current study were told they would be able to choose their own gift from a standard set of options, thereby eliminating concern that their performance on the self-control measure was aimed at persuading the experimenter to offer them a better gift or a more appealing set of options. Self-Regulation and Choice, p. 16 EXPERIMENT 3 To provide further evidence of the detrimental impact of making choices on subsequent selfregulation, Experiment 3 was designed as a conceptual replication of Experiment 2 but with new procedures for both the choice task manipulation and the dependent measure of self-regulation. Instead of making choices among small household products, participants in this study made choices (or not, in the no choice condition) regarding the courses they would take to satisfy their degree requirements. They were encouraged to take these choices seriously as if they were actually selecting the classes they were to take in future years, so it seems reasonable to assume that they would regard these choices as important and relevant to their lives. Self-regulation was measured in terms of resisting procrastination. Participants were given 15 minutes to study for an upcoming nonverbal (math) intelligence test that was framed as a predictor of many desirable life outcomes. To practice, participants were given a packet of sample problems. However, as a competing temptation, they were also allowed to read magazines and play a video game. We assumed that self-regulation would be required to override the seductive pull of games and magazines and make oneself practice arithmetic problems. Most likely, this is a self-regulation dilemma that would be familiar to many college students, namely whether to push oneself to study for a test or indulge in more pleasant pastimes. We hypothesized that choosing one’s courses would deplete the self’s resources, as compared to merely reading about courses and requirements without choosing. We predicted that participants who made choices would spend more of their time on the time-wasting temptations of magazines and video game and, correspondingly, would spend less time studying for the upcoming test.