Verifying End-to-End Protocols using Induction with CSP/FDR
نویسندگان
چکیده
We investigate a technique, suitable for process algebraic, nite-state machine (model-checking) automated tools, for formally modelling arbitrary network topologies. We model aspects of a protocol for multiservice networks, and demonstrate how the technique can be used to verify end-to-end properties of protocols designed for arbitrary numbers of intermediate nodes. Our models are presented in a version of CSP allowing automatic veri cation with the FDR software tool. They encompass both inductive and non-inductive behaviours.
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تاریخ انتشار 1999