The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
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چکیده
While the computational complexity of many game-theoretic solution concepts, notably Nash equilibrium, has now been settled, the question of determining the exact complexity of computing an evolutionarily stable strategy has resisted solution since attention was drawn to it in 2004. In this article, I settle this question by proving that determining the existence of an evolutionarily stable strategy is Σ2 -complete.
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تاریخ انتشار 2013