Reputation in the Venture Games

نویسندگان

  • Philip Hendrix
  • Barbara J. Grosz
چکیده

In many environments, interdependent agents must work cooperatively to be successful. Cooperative ventures require the participation of multiple partners, and successful ventures require that all partners in the venture fulfill their obligations. In such environments, an agent must identify potential partners with the ability and willingness to help it reach its goals while avoiding potential partners who lack the skill or the motivation to help the agent succeed. This paper addresses the problem of how agents in an uncertain world may gain knowledge about the competence of potential partners under a variety of circumstances and use that knowledge to their benefit. As used in this study, competence is a measure of whether an agent has the skills and resources to complete a venture successfully.1 Different potential partners have different levels of competence, so any knowledge regarding the competence of particular individuals provides a competitive edge in deciding whether to deal with those individuals. Reputation—a community-based assessment of agent competence—can augment direct experience, but is prone to error. A large series of experiments was conducted to study systematically the extent to which the usefulness of reputation information varies by group size, group competence, use of reputation, and error in the reputation information. Results confirm that the relative usefulness of direct experience and reputation depends on the particular multi-agent setting and that the utility received from reputation increases as group size increases. The study also yielded two surprising results: first, a pigeonholing phenomenon2 in which reputation wrongly identifies some agents as having sub-par competence based on early random sequences of poor performance, even when agents are generally highly capable. This effect can be countered by introducing systematic positive bias to the reputation system. Second, reputation is useful even in small groups, but only before agents have had much opportunity to interact.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Path dependencies in venture capital markets

This paper examines the impact of venture capitalists’ reputation building and experience accumulation on the genesis of venture capital markets. Venture capitalists must accumulate experience to successfully support high-technology enterprises. They must build reputation, i.e., a track record for successfully financing high-technology enterprises, in order to raise new funds from outside inves...

متن کامل

Does Venture Capital Reputation Matter? Evidence from Subsequent IPOs.⋅

Reputation of a venture capitalist (VC) is based on experience, expertise and past performance. We investigate the relation between VC reputation measures and both the probability of future IPOs and their long-run performance. We measure long-run firm performance following three widely used approaches, namely industry-adjusted operating performance, market-to-book ratio, and long-run listing su...

متن کامل

The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public Offering*

This paper describes board size and composition and investigates the role of venture capital in a sample of 1,116 firms’ initial public offerings. First, firms backed by venture capital have fewer insider and instrumental directors and more independent outsiders. Second, we consider board composition as the outcome of a bargain between the CEO and outside shareholders. Representation of indepen...

متن کامل

Research Notes and Commentaries Unraveling the Mechanisms of Reputation and Alliance Formation: a Study of Venture Capital Syndication in China

Extant research shows that resources are significant to a firm’s choice of alliance formation. We focus on an important form of intangible resource—firm reputation—and examine how it affects a firm’s propensity to form alliances. We propose an inverted U-shaped relationship between a firm’s reputation and its likelihood of alliance formation, resulting from the opposing mechanisms of opportunit...

متن کامل

Play It Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning in Restarting, Finitely-repeated Dilemma Games

Previous research has shown that opportunities for two-sided partner choice in finitely repeated social dilemma games can promote cooperation through a combination of sorting and opportunistic signaling, with late period defections by selfish players causing an end-game decline. How such experience would affect play of subsequent finitely-repeated games remains unclear. In each of six treatment...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2007