PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ PRÉCIS OF ACTION IN PERCEPTION
نویسنده
چکیده
The main idea of this book is that perceiving is a way of acting. Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do. Think of a blind person taptapping his or her way around a cluttered space, perceiving that space by touch, not all at once, but through time, by skillful probing and movement. This is, or at least ought to be, our paradigm of what perceiving is. The world makes itself available to the perceiver through physical movement and interaction. In this book I argue that all perception is touch-like in this way: perceptual experience acquires content thanks to our possession of bodily skills. What we perceive is determined by what we do (or what we know how to do); it is determined by what we are ready to do. In ways I try to make precise, we enact our perceptual experience; we act it out.
منابع مشابه
PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ The “Conscious” Dorsal Stream: Embodied Simulation and its Role in Space and Action Conscious Awareness
The aim of the present article is three-fold. First, it aims to show that perception requires action. This is most evident for some types of visual percept (e.g. space perception and action perception). Second, it aims to show that the distinction of the cortical visual processing into two streams is insufficient and leads to possible misunderstandings on the true nature of perceptual processes...
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متن کاملPSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ METZINGER: PRECIS OF BEING NO ONE 1 Précis: Being No One
This is a short sketch of some central ideas developed in my recent book Being No One (BNO hereafter). A more systematic summary, which focuses on short answers to a set of specific, individual questions is already contained in the book, namely as BNO section 8.2. Here, I deliberately and completely exclude all work related to semantically differentiating and empirically constraining the philos...
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تاریخ انتشار 2006