Fully allocating a commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences
نویسنده
چکیده
We survey the literature devoted to the study of the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked. We formulate a number of normative and strategic requirements on rules, and study their implications when imposed in various combinations. A unique rule emerges as being the best-behaved from a variety of viewpoints: the uniform rule. Key-words: single-peaked preferences; resource monotonicity; population monotonicity; consistency; Nash implementation; strategy-proofness; constrained equal-distance rule; constrained equal-preferred-sets rule; proportional rule; uniform rule. JEL classification numbers: C72; D50; D63; D71
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