Counterfactuals as Strict Conditionals

This paper presents a new deductive argument for the strict conditional analysis of counterfactual conditionals, as against the dominant variably strict analysis due to Robert Stalnaker (1968) and David Lewis (1973). Counterfactual conditionals belong to a broader linguistic family of counterfactual modals. The argument offered here turns on facts about the logical interaction of counterfactual conditionals and counterfactual possibility modals (like “could” and “might”). I call this the Coordination Argument. The argument not only validates the strict conditional analysis of counterfactual conditionals, it also implies a distinctive account of their semantic relationship to counterfactual modality generally. I call this the Coordinated Analysis. This view in turn sheds light on the division of communicative labor between semantics and pragmatics in counterfactual discourse. The paper is divided into three major parts. In Section 1, I review the necessary theoretical background: the semantics of counterfactual possibility modals, the semantics proposed by the rival theories of counterfactual conditionals, and the precise distinction between these theories. Section 2 is the heart of the paper: here I present the Coordination Argument for the strict analysis. In Section 3, I reply to a range of possible objections. Section 4 is a conclusion.