Inquisitive assertions and nonveridicality

In this brief note, I discuss how basic is, in natural language, the distinction between an assertion and a question. The question is currently debated within inquisitive semantics [14]; [1];[2]) and in addressing it, I look at sentences with modal verbs, questions, and disjunctions. These seem to form a natural class in terms of conveying epistemic states that allow p and ¬p, they are therefore nonveridical ( [6]; [7]; [25]). Given that allowing p and ¬p is also the hallmark of inquisitive sentences (questions), we can think of nonveridical assertions as ’inquisitive assertions’. So, if we take (non)veridicality into consideration, the distinction between assertion and question is not categorical: assertions do not form a natural class, and nonveridical assertions pattern epistemically with questions. This means that the difference between questions and assertions as a division of labor between informativity and inquisitiveness cannot be categorical either. These conclusions support the original tenet of inquisitive semantics that meaning is semantically non-dichotomous. I also include discussion of the difference between questions on the one hand, and universal modal assertions on the other. I argue that the former convey a true nonveridical equilibrium between p and ¬p, whereas universal modal assertions have bias towards p. This bias creates partial informativity in universal modal assertions— and when present, in questions.